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NEW YORK ECONOMIC REVIEW 
The New York Free Banking Era: 
Deregulation or Reregulation? 
Andrew Economopoulos* 
The deregulation of the banking market is a frequently debated pol icy 
issue.1 Proponents of deregulation claim that free market forces would 
improve market efficiency. The basis for thei r argument is grounded in the 
work and tenets of Adam Smith. Deregulation opponents claim that a bank 
market left unfettered would disrupt th e financial market; bank 
mismanagement, failures, and panics would pervade the market and cause 
distrust of the banking system . Opponents of deregulation derive their 
beliefs f orm actual historical experiences rather than theory . Many 
opponents point to a period of American banking history, called the Free 
Banki ng Era (1838-1863), in whi ch banks entered the market without 
government sanction. The traditional accounts depict a period of financial 
chaos; "wildcat' banking, large noteholder losses, counterfeit banknotes 
and bank failures were commonplace. Opponents contend that the turmoil 
during the free banking period could again occur if the banking market 
were deregulated ) 
The arguments put forth by opponents can be contested on two 
grounds. First, several recent studies have shown that "wildcat" banking, 
large noteholder losses and bank failures were limited to a few states. The 
evidence also indicates that noteholders of failed banks were usually 
compensated for their holdings.3 Second, the opponents have erroneously 
equated the free banking period with a period of free compet ition . 
Although potentia l entrants were free to enter without government 
sanction, the free banks were subject to numerous constraints and were 
under close scrutiny by the state and the public 4 In fact, a prel iminary 
investigation of the New York banking laws (one of the free banking states) 
shows that the banking laws prior to the free banking period were more 
lenient than the free banking laws. Based on the New York evidence, one 
may contend that the free banking laws reregulated rather than 
deregulated the banking market. 
*Millsaps College 
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BANKING LAWS IN NEW YORK PRIOR 
TO THE FREE BANKING ERA 
SPRING 1987 
Between 1781 and 1804, th e New York legis latu re issued special 
franchise ri ghts t o carryon the business of banking under incorporated 
charters. The guidelines and privi leges of the incorporated banks were 
specified in the charters iss ued by t he leg islature . The charters were 
individually constructed ; each chapter specified t he amount of capital, the 
place of operations, and t he necessary t ransact ions of normal operations of 
the bank. One function t hat characterized banks during this period was the 
issuance of debt circulating as currency. The debt, commonly called 
banknotes, were small denom i nated promissory notes that were 
redeemable into specie on demand by the noteholder. The banks, 
however, were not the only entities that could issue debt.s Any business 
during this period could issue small denominated debt payable to the 
bearer on demand . The stockholders of these II uni ncorporated II banks 
were subject to unlimited personal liability, but they were not constrained 
bylaw. 
In 1804, New York enacted laws that distinguished the right to borrow 
for business needs from the right to borrow with the intent to use the debt 
as a medium of exchange. The effect of these restraints was to give the 
state the exclusive right to delegate the privilege of banking. 
Consequently, incorporated banks became the sole issuers of bank notes 
and achieved monopoly status. 
The practice of granting individual charters continued until 1828. In 
1828 the legislature reformed the chartering system by enacting a general 
banking law which required all charter banks approved thereaher, by the 
legislature, to be subject to the provisions in the general bank ing law. 
Some of the reforms of the general banki ng law were stri ngent. One 
section of the law called for the unlimited liability of the directors and 
stockholders. This section was repealed fifteen months later and was 
replaced by the safety fund system . This system required all new banks to 
contribute up to 3% of their capital to a special safety fund held by the 
state bank commissioners. Creditors of insolvent safety fund charter banks 
could apply to the fund for the outstanding debts of the bank . The 
contemporaries of the amendment envisioned that the fund would provide 
the necessary insurance for the bank creditors and therefore, release the 
stockholders from their personal liability. 
The amended general law contained five areas of reform . A synopsis 
of the five reform areas is given in Table 1. The main objectives of the 
reform were to specify the scope of operations; to protect the bank creditor 
from losses; to establish the personal accountability of the stockholders and 
directors; to limit the financial leverage of the chartered bank; and to set 
guidelines for the maintenance of the capital stock . 
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Table 1. New York Charter Bank Regulations 
A. Capital Base Restrictions: 
(1) Capltallssetbycharter . 
(2) Withdrawa l of cap ital by stockholders through excessive dividend or reduction of 
capital from bad debts reqU ire corrective action by the directors. 
(3) Hypothlcatlon of bank stock IS prohibited 
(4) Fraud ulent transfer of bank property IS prohibited 
B. Financial Leverage: 
(1) Loans and discounts are limited to two and one half times paid -in capital. 
(2) Bank notes Issued to the publiC are limited to two times paid -in capital 
(3) If Original capital depreciates, bank IS required to call In loans In order to maintain 
statutory limits . 
C. Scope of Operations: 
(1) Bank pow ers are li m ited to discount ing bills , notes and other eVidences of debt; 
receiving deposits; bUYing and seiling of gold and silver bullion , COins and bills of 
exchange ; ISSUing bills, note and other eVidences of debt; and exercIsing such 
other Incidental pow ers, as shall be necessary to carryon such bUSiness 
(2) Banknotes denominated under one dollar are prohibited . 
(3) Annual rate of Interest IS lim ited to 6% . 
(4) Banknotes payable at a later date With Interest are prohibited 
(5) Suspension of specie payments for 90 days results in forfeiture o f bank ing 
privileges. 
(6) Purchase of real estate for the bank 's portf o lio IS prohibited . 
D. Accountability of Banking Operations: 
(,) Annual statement of finanC ial condit io ns IS required and del ivered to bank 
commissioners . 
(2) Bank commissioners are required to Inspect banks quarterly 
(3) Reports of commiSSioners are open to the public. 
E. Safety of Bank Creditor: 
(1) Director is personally liable t o stockholders and creditors If d irector Violates any 
statutory requirements 2 
(2) Liability to stockholders IS limited to amount of shares subscribed J 
(3) Contributions to a speCial fund are required by all banks Each bank IS required t o 
pay 3% of capital to bank commiSSioner for the ultimate redemption of bank 
liabilities of Insolvent banks 
lApplled to banks established after 1825 
2The original law called for the unlimited personal liability of stockholders and directors 
These statutes were repealed by the safety fund . 
3Stockholder was liable for shares subscribed , even If the stock holde r did not purchase all 
the shares subscribed . 
Source : Cleaveland and Hutchinson 
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The reform legislation was revolutionary in several ways. First, it 
clearly defined the functions of a bank . Prior to the reform legislation, the 
charter defined the bank by the restraints imposed . The reform statute was 
the first legal definition of the bank's responsibilities. Second, the reforms 
established an insurance fund for the bank creditors-the first of its kind . 
Third, the reforms required, for the first time, annual reports from the 
charter bank and created a supervisory panel to monitor the banks. 
Finally, for the first time laws were enacted to prevent fraudulent 
behavior. Such behavior would result in dissolution of banking privilege 
and legal action . One reason for the enactment of these statutes as that 
the director and stockholders of two charter banks were under 
investigation for fraudulent practice during the years of reform . 
The changes in the laws, however, did not prevent abuses within the 
system .6 Some of the charter banks were found guilty of impropriety while 
legislators were indicted for selling legislative favors'? Such corruption led 
to the enactment of the free banking laws. 
FREE BANKING LAWS 
The regulators envisioned the free banking laws as a means of 
eliminating the problems associated with legislative approval of bank 
charters, while establishing a system that would protect the noteholder. 
The free banking laws allowed any number of persons to open a bank at 
any time as long as the bank met minimum capital requirements. Once the 
minimum capital was raised, a certificate of operations was filed with the 
bank commissioners. Unlike charter banks, fr ee banks were prohibited 
from printing banknotes. Free banks desiring to issue banknotes could 
obtain banknotes from the bank commissioner by exchanging marketable 
securities for the notes. The securities were held as collateral for the 
eventual redemption of the banknotes. 
The f ree banking law also incorporated a number of the charter 
provisions: the prohibition of holding real estate as an income generating 
asset; the requirement that the capital stock be maintained; the restriction 
on the maximum interest rate charged on loans and discounts; and the 
requirement that the bank's financial condition be reported to the 
commissioners. 
However, the constitutionality of the free banking law was challenged 
within the fi rst year of its enactment. The suit contended that the free 
banking law was improperly enacted. According t o the New York 
Constitution, a 2/3 vote of approval by the legislature was necessary for 
incorporation and the free banking law was passed with less than 2/3 vote 
of approval. But, the free banking law specified that any number of 
persons could gather to form an "association" for the purpose of banking. 
Since the free banking law call ed these banks" associations" rather than 
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corporations, it was believed that the constitutional requi rement did not 
apply. 
The New York Supreme Court, however, ruled that the free bank 
associations were corporations and that their legal existence was in 
questi on . In 1846, an amended New York state constitution was approved 
by the populace which established the legal existence of the free bank as a 
corporation . 
The recognition of corporate status implied that the free bank was 
al so subject t o the reform legislation of 1828 and 1829, and exempt only 
where t he free bank law specified otherwise .4 The areas of d istinction 
between the laws are summarized in Table 2. An exam inati on of Table 2 
indicates that the restrictions imposed on the free banks were more 
stringent than the restr ictions on th e charter banks. In fact, the free 
banking law placed additional responsibility on the free bank . For instance, 
the free banks were requi red to submit semi-annual re ports rather than 
annual reports t o the bank commissions. In addition, these reports were to 
be published in local newspapers. Charter banks had no such requirement . 
Both restrictions improved the monitoring of the free bank by the public. 
Free banks were also required t o secure their banknotes with 
marketable securit ies. The market security reserve was in li eu of the safety 
fund and effectively eliminated the financial leverage ceilin g placed on 
charter banks. Although the provisi on represented freed om to expand 
liabilities, the provision also supplied valuable information to the 
noteholder about the financial stability of the free bank. Current studies of 
the free banking period have found that free bank failures occurred during 
periods of falling asset prices .S A fall in asset prices signaled to the 
noteholder that the securities backing the banknotes may have 
depreciated .6 Potential expected losses from holding the banknotes 
motivated the noteholders to go to the bank and redeem their banknotes. 
Consequently, the market security provision established a new means of 
evaluating the financial condition of the free bank's portfolio for the 
noteholder. 
The value of the information provided by the semi-annual reports and 
by the market securities was magnified by the new provisions that gave the 
noteholder legal rights to inspect the books of the bank and to initiate 
dissolution proceedings. The free banking laws specified the legal recourse 
when the free bank defaulted on a payment. If a free bank noteholder's 
request for specie was refused, the noteholder could seek an injunct ion 
against the bank by filing an affidavit of non-payment with the bank 
commissioner. From the date of the fi ling, the free bank had 10 days to 
comply with the noteholder's request, otherwise the bank commissioner 
would be required to start dissolution proceedings. Noteholders of defunct 
free banks were also compensated for the inconvenience. Free banks were 
required to pay 14% interest to all noteholders . Such rights and 
compensation were not granted to the charter bank noteholder. 
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Table 2. Differences in the Reform laws and the Free Banking laws 1 
A. Provisions Found in Both laws: 
Free Bank Charter Bank 
(1 ) Report to commissioner Semi-Annual Annual 
(2) Grace period to honor 10 days 90 days 
the payment of 
banknotes 
(3) Accessib ility to the a Open to public Open to public 
bank's records at commissioner's at commissioner's 
office office 
b Open to creditor 
or stockholder whose 
Investment IS equal 
to or greater than 
$1 ,000 
(4) Security of Bank Marke t Security Safety Fund 
Creditors Reserve 
B. Provisions Pertaining to Free Banks: 
(1) Semi -annual reports to be published In local newspapers of free bank 
(2) Noteholders have the right to start proceedings against free banks for the failure 
of redemption . 
(3) Noteholder has first lien on the assets . 
(4) Free banks are required to establish a specie reserve at the bank equal to 12t% of 
ci rculating bank notes. 
(5) Unlimited expansion of assets and liabilities 
(6) Penalty for defaulting on noteholders request of specie of 14% per annum . 
lThe companson IS between the reform laws and the onglnal free banking law Subsequent 
changes In the free banking law are not considered 
Source : Cleaveland and Hutchinson 
The laws also gave the noteholder of $1000 or more the right to 
examine the financial records of the banks at any time. However, the law 
required the noteholder t o have an officer of t he court to assist in the 
examinati on .7 If in the judgment of the noteholder and the court officer 
the investments were deemed unsound, then proceedings against the free 
bank would be initiated . 
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CONCLUSION 
The comparison of the free banking law and the charter. regulations 
indicates that free banks and charter banks operated under similar 
constraints. Many of the constraints imposed on the free bank were carr ied 
over from the charter banking system when the Supreme Court ruled that 
charter regulations also applied to the free bank. The major distinction of 
free access t o the market for free banks still held . However, in exchange for 
the freedom to enter, more stringent constraints were imposed and new 
restrictions were enacted . The most notable modification was the 100% 
market security reserve in lieu of the safety fund . New restrictions required 
more information and greater access to the financial records of the free 
bank and the legal rights of the noteholder were specified . 
Two implications can be drawn from this comparison . First, the free 
banking laws reregulated rather than deregulated the banking market. 
The comparison in Table 2 shows that the regulations governing the free 
banks were more restrictive than those placed on the charter banks . 
Secondly, the argument by deregulation opponents that the free banking 
market was an experiment in free competition that failed is unsupported by 
this comparison . Instead of characterizing the free banking experience as 
one governed by free market competition, the experi ence should be 
viewed in light of the new restrictions. The determ ination of the im pact of 
the restrictions on the free banking laws on the free banking experience 
would provide better insight into the possible causes of bank failures and 




1. Milton Friedman, one of the staunchest supporters of free enterprise, 
rejects the notion of laissez-faire banking . He argues that while it has 
some merit "it could not, however, solve t he problems of inherent 
instability." Milton Friedman, A Program for Monetary Stability, (New 
York : Fordham University Press, 1959). 
2. Arthur Rolnick and Warren E. Weber, "New Evidences on the Free 
Banking Era", American Economic Review 73 (December 1983) : 1080-
1091 . 
3. Detailed discussions on the abuses of the system in New York are 
presented in Robert E. Chaddock, The Safety Fund Banking System in 
New York 1829- 1866, (Washington : Government Printing Office, 
1910) p. 376 and in P. Cleaveland and G.S. Hutchinson, The Banking 
System of the State of New York, (New York : J. S. Voorshies, 1864: 
Reprint ed ., New York : Arno Press, 1980) p. LlX . 
4. In Cleaveland , page 8, the Supreme Court decision is given. It states 
t hat "free banks 'a re corporations and that they are subject to the 
general provision of the law which are applicable to like corporations, 
except where the above act and subsequent legislation have 
otherwise provided .'" 
5. A . Rolnick and W .E. Weber contend that one of the constraints may 
have caused some of t he problems of the period; see "The Causes of 
Free Bank Failures: A Detail Explanation", Journal of Monetary Theory 
14 (October 1984), pp. 267-291. 
6. The information on the free bank's portfolio was available to the 
. public. In one instance, the New York Times of January 16, 1853 
provided a complete listing of all t he securities held as collateral for 
banknotes . Banker Magazine (a monthly newspaper) would also 
provide information on new banks that entered the market and the 
securities that backed the banknotes. 
7. Stockholders of the free bank also had the right to inspect the books 
of the bank at any time. 
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